The Right of the State to Inflict Capital Punishment by Most Reverend Thomas J. Riley
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 6 
Number 4 Volume 6, Autumn 1960, Number 4 Article 4 
June 2016 
The Right of the State to Inflict Capital Punishment 
Most Reverend Thomas J. Riley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Ethics and Political 
Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Most Reverend Thomas J. Riley (1960) "The Right of the State to Inflict Capital Punishment," The Catholic 
Lawyer: Vol. 6 : No. 4 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol6/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE RIGHT OF THE STATE
TO INFLICT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
MOST REVEREND THOMAS J. RILEY*
O N DECEMBER 30, 1958, the Special Commission established in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the purpose of investi-
gating and studying the abolition of the death penalty in capital cases
presented to the Governor the final report of its deliberations. The
majority report of the Commission recommended the abolition of the
death penalty. A minority report, signed by two members of the Com-
mission, one of whom was the present writer, held that abolition would
be inopportune at this time. The present article embodies the reasoning
which led to this conclusion.
The opinion to which I have subscribed assumes and is derived from
the following fundamental postulates:
1)There is a supreme and all-perfect Being, God, Who has created
man and upon Whom man depends for his continued existence.
2) By his possession of a spiritual soul, which is the source and
explanation of his characteristically human activity, man is elevated
above the material universe with which his body is related.
3) Man is capable of self-determined activity, through which he
rises above the factors which may exercise a compulsive influence
upon him. The normal man is thus capable of charting his own course
over the period of his earthly existence.
4) In the relationship between man and God there arises the moral
law, which is the expression of man's obligation to follow those courses
of action which are in conformity with the essential requirements and
tendencies of his nature, and to avoid those courses of action which
lack this conformity.
5) As created by God, man is destined to live in society with his
fellow men. Man's natural social condition implies the existence of a
social entity, of which the organized expression is the state.
*Auxiliary Bishop of Boston.
6) The purpose of the state is to provide
for the temporal welfare of its individual
members. The very nature of the state
implies, therefore, divine authorization to
take whatever steps are necessary to assure
its own existence and to guard against the
dangers which threaten it, consistent with
the more fundamental principles of the
natural law.
7) Only God, Who created human life,
has the right to take it away. Since, how-
ever, the authority of the state derives ulti-
matery from God, and is exercised in God's
name, it is not inconsistent to hold that the
state may claim the right, in the name of
God, to take away human life in circum-
stances in which this would appear clearly
to be in accord with God's own will.
8) It is beyond the authority of the
state to take directly the life of any human
being. The right of each man to his life is
anterior to the existence of the state. When,
however, a man, through his own fault, has
endangered the right of the state to carry
on its divinely appointed functions, there
may be reason to assume that he has for-
feited his God-given right to live, and that
the taking of his life may be justified as an
indispensable means of protecting society
from serious harm.
Human history bears witness to the per-
sistent conviction that the state has a natu-
ral" right to inflict the death penalty. It
would be wrong to hold that capital pun-
ishment is an essential violation of the law
of God, and that the taking of human life
by the state represents essentially a tamper-
ing with rights which God reserves exclu-
sivelS, to Himself. Nor would it be right to
assert that an individual member of human
society has an absolute right to his life that
is beyond all attack on the part of the state.
On the other hand, it is clear that the
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taking of human life by the state can be
justified only when no other means will be
effective in safeguarding its essential inter-
ests from criminally immoral attack. Only
a malefactor can be put to death by the
state, and only when the taking of his life
will be a necessary means for the strength-
ening of human society against attack upon
its fundamental structure.
No one can deny that there have been
grave abuses connected with the exercise by
the state of its right to inflict the death pen-
alty. History records the regrettable facts
that men have been put to death by state
governments for trivial reasons, in brutal
and abhorrent ways, and in satisfaction of
the basest of human passions.
We should not, however, allow the abuses
connected with the exercise of the right of
capital punishment to obscure our under-
standing of the considerations which justify
this right in principle. We should not argue
that, because the death penalty has often
been imposed for minor crimes, there can
never be a crime of major proportions for
which it w ould be a necessary means for
the protection of society. We should not
identify the death penalty, itself, with the
gruesome methods which have been em-
ployed in particular situations or by indi-
vidual executioners. We should not infer
from the fact that motives of hatred or
vengeance are often associated with the
inflicting of capital punishment that such
motives constitute the only reasons for
which the death penalty could be demanded
or justified.
It is the opinion of the writer, therefore,
that the supreme authority of the state has
the right to inflict the death penalty when
it can be shown to be a necessary means for
protecting society against criminal attack
which endangers its very foundations. It is
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likewise the opinion of the writer that the
death penalty for first degree murder, as it
exists at present in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, is justified in principle on
these grounds.
This conclusion would seem to issue
from the following considerations. First of
all, the state may take the life of a human
being only in punishment of a crime of
serious proportions. Chpital punishment is
essentially punishment. It is not basically
and radically a measure for the protection
of society, even though this is the reason
and the only reason for which it can be
invoked. The state can take human life
only in punishment of serious crime. The
right of capital punishment does not derive
immediately from the obligation of the
state to protect the common good. The
death penalty cannot be inflicted merely
to rid society of undesirable members. Nor
can it be inflicted merely because an ob-
jectively criminal act has been committed,
without reference to the subjective guilt of
the criminal. Execution of a person by the
state must represent essentially a punish-
ment which fits a crime. It is thus pri-
marily an exercise of vindicative justice, by
which steps are taken to restore the order
of society which has been wilfully and
seriously violated.
Secondly, the infliction of capital pun-
ishment can be justified only if it serves
as a deterrent in relation to future possible
crimes of the same order, and only if less
drastic measures toward the same end will
not be sufficiently effective.
It is at this point that differences of
opinion arise among those who admit in
principle the right of the state to inflict
the death penalty. Does the death penalty
serve as a deterrent? Will life imprisonment,
or any other penal measure, afford suffi-
cient protection against the crime of first
degree murder for which the death penalty
is now decreed? These are the important
questions which I shall attempt. to answer,
and upon which the validity of the opinion
which is presented in this article will
depend.
Does the death penalty for first degree
murder really serve as a deterrent to poten-
tial murderers? All human beings ..fear
the loss of their lives, even those who may
be suffering from major mental disturb-
ances. The instinct of self-preservation -is
so fundamental that the threat of death,
apprehended as such, must have a power-
ful determining influence on the voluntary
direction of human activity. No -one will
knowingly drink poison or cast himself over
a precipice unless he is so deranged that
he cannot evaluate the consequences of
what he is doing, or unless he studiously
chooses the alternative of death to con-
tinued existence in what he judges to be
an intolerable situation. The claim that the
death penalty, in itself decreed for the com-
mitting of a major crime, will not exercise
a deterring influence on the great majority
of potential criminals, contradicts one of
the fundamental facts of human psychology.
What of statistics which seem to show
that the incidence of crime does not vary
consistently with the presence or absence
of the death penalty? These statistics have
obvious reference to the particular circum-
stances in which the death penalty is in-
flicted. In point of fact, the death penalty,
in states in which it exists, is incurred by
only a small percentage of those who com-
mit murder. It is impossible, of course, for
the penalty to be implemented quickly and
with unerring accuracy. Legal procedures,
extending over long periods of time', are
required to establish the moraliesponsi-
bility of one who has been charged with
murder. The welfare of society as a whole
demands that every possible precaution be
taken against the execution of one whom
the law would require to be spared.
This necessary delay in the carrying out
of the death penalty will tend to reduce the
effectiveness of the penalty as a deterrent
measure. And because legal procedures are
so complicated and so difficult of organiza-
tion, the possibility is created that even
those who are guilty before the law of the
crimes with which they are charged may
not be proven guilty by the courts. Some
lawyers have remarked on the effect of the
slowness with which trials for murders are
conducted. The claim has been made,
moreover, that those who have unlimited
wealth at their disposal will almost cer-
tainly escape the death penalty, while those
who are poor and unfortunate are more
likely to be its victims.
All these factors are represented in the
statistics which seem to indicate that the
death penalty is not a deterrent to potential
murderers. It seems quite possible, there-
fore, that the reason why the death penalty
is not effective is the difficulty of applying
it to concrete cases and the correspondingly
increased possibility that the murderer may
escape the penalty which the law decrees.
This point should, it would seem, be kept
in mind as I attempt to evaluate the statis-
tics to which the advocates of abolition
attach such great significance. It does not
seem logical to say that the death penalty
should be abolished because statistics prove
that it is not a deterrent. It seems more
consistent to urge that every effort be made
to minimize the influence on the effective-
ness of the death penalty of factors extrin-
sic to itself, and thus, to realize to the
.maximum its intrinsic value. The death
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penalty strikes deeply at the possession of
the bodily life which is for everyone the
root and foundation of every other earthly
possession and satisfaction. If we admit
that the state has, in principle, the right to
inflict it, we should admit likewise a cor-
responding obligation on the part of the
state to make it effective; and we should not
urge failure to do this as proof that the
death penalty itself is not effective.
Will life imprisonment, or some other
penal measure, afford sufficient protection
to society against the crime of first-degree
murder for which the death penalty is now
decreed? Many advocates of abolition who
have agreed with what has been already
said will answer this last question affirma-
tively. We have reached, they will say, a
point in the development of human society
at which it is no longer necessary to resort
to the drastic measure of capital punish-
ment as a means of safeguarding society
from the dangers created by potential
criminals. The criminal, they say, should
be punished in some less severe way which
will leave open the possibility of his reha-
bilitation and his eventual restoration to
full membership in society. In any event,
he should be allowed to run the course of
his natural life, atoning in enforced isola-
tion for the wrong which he has done and
no longer presenting a danger to society of
further criminal activity.
In answer to this kind of argument I
may point to the obvious fact that crime of
all description is increasing both in numeri-
cal occurrence and in the efficiency of the
methods by which it is perpetrated. Respect
for the moral law is diminishing. Those who
seek illegitimate-gain hesitate less and less
to sacrifice human life when it suits their
purposes to do so.
The movement to abolish capital punisb-
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ment should, it would seem, be integrated
with more comprehensive efforts to strike
at the roots of the criminal tendencies
which threaten the future of our democratic
institutions. I look forward, as do many
whose testimony I heard as a member of
the Commission, to the time when it may
be possible to dispense with the death
penalty. It is my conviction, however, that
as a society, we have not yet reached the
stage of moral development at which it
would be prudent to remove a safeguard
judged to be necessary by so many who are
charged with the heavy responsibility of
protecting human life against criminal at-
tack. Large numbers of law-enforcement
officers have urgently demanded that the
death penalty be retained. These men have
not, to be suro, made the speculative study
of the problem that would enable them to
present their conilusions in compelling sta-
tistical form. Their point of view is not,
however, for this reason to be taken lightly,
especially since they insist that their own
lives are endangered by their efforts to pro-
tect the lives and property of their fellow
men, and would be even more seriously
threatened if the death penalty were abol-
ished.
Here again, I am faced with the objec-
tion of statistical evidence which seems to
indicate that murders of law-enforcement
officers do not vary consistently with the
presence of the death penalty. I suggest
that here too there may be hidden factors
which may alter the significance of the
data presented. A law-enforcement officer
is a human being. His strongest natural ten-
dency is to protect and preserve his own
life. If he has become strongly convinced
in his past experience that the death pen-
alty is a necessary deterrent measure, his
reaction to abolition might well be to relax
his eflfdr§ id ef^or&e the lIaw when ie fuUi
discharge of hlis ddty might place his own
life in jeopardy.
I am not suggesting that any pu-iely SbL-
jective impressions of law-enforcement
officers should be accepted as sufficient
reasons for retaining the death penalty.
What I do say is that the convictions of
law-enforcement officers on the necessity of
the death penalty, earnestly expressed by
so many of their representatives, should
not be dismissed as groundless because of
the lack of confirmatory statistical evi-
dence.
Many of those who acted as spokesmen
for their associates before the Commission
used language which betrayed a high de-
gree of emotional reaction. Possibly, many
of them have found it difficult to dissociate
in their thinking on the subject those
motives which are morally sound from
other motives which would be questionable
on moral grounds as indicative of hatred
or revenge.
Beyond all these questionable elements
in the presentation of their arguments, how-
ever, there lies a groundwork of objective
truth toward which their convictions are
directed. I feel that society owes to them
every possible measure of protection, and
that it would be imprudent at the present
time to disregard their warning that aboli-
tion of the death penalty would hamper
them in their' efforts to maintain public
order.
This writer has likewise been deeply im-
pressed by the honesty and sincerity of
those who appeared before the Commission
to urge abolition of the death penalty.
Many are experts in their respective fields,
and their conclusions have obviously fol-
lowed upon careful and scientifically con-
trolled study. It seems clear that in this
matter there can be honest differences .of
opinion, and that the point of view which
is expressed in this article would be sub-
ject to revision at some future time under
the influence of an improved condition of
society.
At the same time, however, I would
challenge the objection that advocacy of
the death penalty as it stands is inconsistent
with either the principles of the natural law
or the findings of modern psychology. I
have already stated the reasons why I feel
that the state has, in principle, the right to
inflict the death penalty. Another objec-
tion, less radical in its origin, but no less
universal in its conclusion, is that capital
punishment is wrong because the death
penalty is irrevocable, and it is thus pos-
sible that a miscarriage of justice may send
an innocent man to his death.
It would be impossible to deny the
premises from which this conclusion is
derived. The conclusion_ itself, however,
does not seem valid. In the first place, the
danger of convicting a person for a crime
which he did not commit, while not abso-
lutely negligible, is, in existing circum-
stances, extremely remote. There is far
greater danger, as I have previously sug-
gested, that a person who is really guilty
of murder may escape the punishment
which the law decrees for him, so carefully
and painstakingly do the courts sift the evi-
dence which would lead to his conviction.
While suggesting, as I already have, that
the procedures of the courts might be expe-
dited to the extent consistent with conser-
vative legal and judicial requirements, I
would not want any change introduced
which would increase the danger of error
in a matter in which error is irreparable.
I do not feel, however, that the mere pos-
sibility of error, which can never be com-
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pletely ruled out, can be urged as a reason
why the right of the state to inflict the
death penalty can be questioned in princi-
ple. It is not possible for human authori-
ties to make judgments which are infallible
in matters which require lengthy delibera-
tion and logical analysis. All that can be
expected of them is that they take every
reasonable precaution against the danger
of error. When this is done by those who
are charged with the application of the law,
the likelihood that errors will be made
descends to an irreducible minimum. If
errors are then made, this is the necessary
price that must be paid within a society
which is made up of human beings and in
which authority is exercised not by angels
but by men themselves. It is not brutal or
unfeeling to suggest that the danger of mis-
carriage of justice must be weighed against
the far greater evils for which the death
penalty aims to provide an effective remedy.
I have likewise met the objection of
many authorities in psychology and psychi-
atry that all murderers are psychopathic
personalities, and that few, if any, murders
are committed by persons who could be
held legally responsible. I recognize the
value of the psychological studies which
have revealed the influence of sub-con-
scious motivation on all forms of human
activity. I have noted disagreement among
psychiatrists themselves, however, as to the
extent to which this motivation is effective.
I would certziinly agree that some murder-
ers are victims of strong impulses which
reduce, if they do not remove completely,
the power of self-determination which is
fundamental to any degree of moral or
legal responsibility.
I maintain, nevertheless, that premedi-
tated murder, for, which full responsibility
should be imputed, is not just a speculative
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possibility, but an imminent danger actually
to be feared. There is such a thing today as
organized crime; it is a big business in this
country. Those who are engaged in it are
highly intelligent and completely unscru-
pulous. They do not hesitate to plan and
commit murder in cold blood when the
need arises. Those whose assistance they
seek in the actual perpetration of crime are
fully aware of the implications and require-
ments of the cooperation which they are
asked to afford.
It is wrong, I hold, to evaluate the moral
or legal responsibility of criminals in terms
simply of their psychological condition at
the moment when they actually commit a
crime. When any wrong deed is committed,
its agent has built up within himself, while
he is still free to conform to the require-
ments of the law, an attitude of intellectual
contempt for what the law demands, and of
voluntary determination to break it. It is
during this period of calm and deliberate
reflection that moral responsibility is in-
curred. A criminal should not be allowed
to plead insanity as a ground for release
from the charges made against him simply
because at the moment at which he actually
perpetrated the crime he was under the
influence of an impulse which he could not
resist. This point of view prescinds entirely
from the crucial question: why was the
criminal under the influence of an irresist-
ible influence? If his personality is habitu-
ally psychopathic, he may well have been
lacking in the moral responsibility for
which he could be legally punished. If,
however, his inability to resist was due to
his having voluntarily prepared for the situ-
ation in which he executed his criminal in-
tention, he is not less but more guilty for
this very reason.
This point of view is presented in the
hope that it may contribute to a better
understanding of the problems which are
fundamental to the controversy which has
arisen regarding the death penalty. I have
tried to distinguish carefully between what
must be held as emerging immediately from
changeless principles and what is subject
to change as involving judgment regarding
contingent facts. That the state has the
right to inflict the death penalty would seem
to be a matter of principle beyond any
question. Whether or not the state should,
in existing circumstances, inflict the death
penalty is a matter concerning which there
may be difference of opinion. My own
answer to this second question represents
only one point of view. I can only say that
in formulating it I have tried to be objec-
tive and to rise above the emotional preju-
dice which so easily injects itself into any
discussion of controversial matters. If the
death penalty is necessary, we must resort
to it. Once we can say, however, that it
can be dispensed with, our arguments in
favor of it lose all force.
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